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FUNDS TRANSFER OPERATIONS: BOON OR BANE
TO THE VIABILITY OF RURAL
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES*
by
Julius P. Relampagos and Mario B. Lamberte**
I. INTRODUCTION
Financial intermediaries are supposed to have two arms. 0._
arm is used to raise funds from surplus units, and the other, t¢
allocate funds to credit-worthy and more productive borrowers. Ir
the Philippines, past financial policies had largely contribute(
to the creation Of incomplete or "one-arm" rural financial inter-
*Paper presented during the ACPC-PIDS-OSU sponsored seminar-
workshop on "Financial Intermediation in the Rural Sector
Research Results and Policy Issues" held on 26-27 September 198(
at the Cuaderno Hall, Central Bank of the Philippines. This i{
part of a larger study on comparative bank analysis joint1:
conducted by the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC)
Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS), and Ohi_
State University (OSU). The project was coordinated by Dr. Mari_
B. Lamberte (PIDS)and Dr. V. Bruce J. Tolentino (ACPC).
**Respectively, Research Associate, PIDS and Vice-President
PIDS. The views expressed in this study are those of the author=
and do not necessarily re_lect those of the Institute.
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mediaries (RFIs). In particular, the subsidized credit prog-
rams of the government made it very profitable for RFZs to func-
tion merely as conduits of government funds. The •failure of
Z/
these credit programs are well-documented. Their main side-
effect is that they retarded the development of the savings
mobilization function of RFIs.
-With the recent withdrawal of subsidized credit programs and
the switch in policy towards greater reliance on market forces,
the availability of formal credit to the rural, agricultural
sector has been greatly reduced. RFIs are then expected to
mobilize more savings to fill in at least the void • left behind by
the withdrawal of such subsidized funds. This approach recog-
nizes the fact that savings can be mobilized even in low-income
communities. The objective Of this new set of
policies is to encourage the emergence of a truly viable RFIs
with fully developed savings mobilization and lending functions.
Only viable RFIs can genuinely contribute to a sustained increase
in the flow of credit to the rural areas.
Savings mobilization appears to be a not so difficult task
of RFIs. With a iberal interest rate policy, a remarkable rise
... . •
i/
RFIs include rural-based branches of commercial banks,
private development banks and unit banks.
ZJ
For example, see Sacay et al (1988).
See Tolentino(1987).
See Lamberte and Bunda (1988),
3in rural deposits has been noted. However, this has not been
matched by a rise in credit to rural areas. As noted by
Lamberte (1987), branches of commercial banks and private devel-
opment banks have transferred most of the funds mobilized in
rural areas to their respective head offices located in Metro
Manila. Thus, we are left again with incomplete RFIs, only this
time, their lending function is not well-developed. This
outcome clearly undermines one of the objectives of pushing
formal financial institutions into rural areas.
So far, the policy response of the government in reversing
the flow of-loanable funds in favor of the rural areas is to
maintain the agricultural loan quota and deposit retention poli-
cies. However, these schemes directly run counter to the
policy of creating truly viable RFIs. There is, therefore, a
need to rethink the entire approach to developing truly viable
RFIs. As a first step, the behavior of banks must be well under-
stood. In this particular case, there is a need to study the
funds transfer operations of bank branches.
3/
See Blanco and Meyer (1988).
The reasons why RFIs prefer not to lend to rural
areas are discussed in Lapar and Graham (1988), Magno and Meyer
(1988), and Untalan and Cuevas (1988).
Z/
The former stipulates that banks allocate 10 percent
of their net loanable funds to agrarian reform beneficiaries and
15 percent, for general agricultural lending while the latter
requires banks to invest 75 percent of their total deposits in
the same service area. (See Lamberte and Lim [1987] for
more details).
4The specific questions this paper aims to answer are:
(I) What is the structure of funds transfer operations of rural-
based branches of banks? Is it from one branch to another?
Or is it from one branch to the head office?
(2) What factors determine the volume of funds transferred from
one branch to another of the same bank?
(3) What is the impact of funds transfer operations on the
savings mobilization efforts of rural-based financial
intermediaries?
The next section discusses some theoretical considerations
regarding funds transfer operations and savings mobilization.
Section IiI presents some empirical results which draw heavily
on Relampagos (1988). Some policy implications are discussed in
the last section.
II, FUNDS TRANSFER OPERATIONS AND SAVINGS MOBILIZATION: SOME
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In the rural areas, the seasonality of economic activity is
clearly visible. It is important to recognize this feature since
it implies a certain pattern in the flow of resources. For
example, in predominantly rice-producing areas, demand for
working capital by farm-households sharply rises during planting
season, while excess funds are being accumulated during harvest
season. In the absence of formal financial institutions in the
rural areas, farmers.source credit from the ICMs during planting
season. At harvest season, they pay their debts. Whatever is
left after provision for home consumption is kept either in cash
or in physical assets (e.g. radios, camera, etc.) which can be
sold or mortgaged when planting season comes to augment their
working capital. Although these forms of savings yield low
returns, still farmers hang on to them because of the absence of
more attractive savings instruments.
Any bank that operates in the rural areas has to squarely
deal with the seasonality of economic activity. The implica-
tion of this seasonality on the flow of funds of a particular
bank situated in a town is depicted in Figure $. Although
there are other economic activities in this town, it is assumed
that one agricultural economic activity, say rice farming, domi-
nates. Of course, this is not an unrealistic assumption as one
scans the rural landscape of the country. It is further assumed
that there are two planting and harvest seasons per year.
Inevitably, the pattern of the demand for credit experienced by
the bank in thiE town follows that of the dominant economic
10/
activity.
For empirical support, see TBAC (1981).
In the case of cash, any positive inflation rate yields
negative return. In the case of physical assets, the cost
involved in liquifying them could be high.
I0/
Note that the demand for credit here refers only to those
of credit-worthy borrowers as perceived by the bank. For a
discussion on the stages in determining credit-worthy borrowers,
see Lapar and Graham (1988).
6
7The presence of a bank in a town provides savers with an
alternative form of saving. It is assumed here that the charac-
teristics of these savings instruments (i.e. yield, risk, liqui-
dity, etc.) are better than cash or physical assets. Although
the savings pattern of households/individuals in a particular
11/
town may be heterogeneous, the existence of a dominant economic
activity implies an aggregate pattern of saving dominated by
those who are engaged in the dominant economic activity. This is
also shown in Figure 1.
During planting season, the bank is likely to experience
heavy withdrawals of deposits, while during harvest season,
a surge in deposits. In both situations, a bank is confronted
with a liquidity problem; that is, it is highly • illiquid
during planting season and too liquid during harvest season.
Since its loanable funds are low during planting season,
the bank cannot meet all the demand for credit, thereby
foregoing profitable earning opportunities. Any increase in the
•interest rate will likely have very minimal •impact on deposits
since the dominant savers are withdrawing their deposits this
period. On the other hand, during harvest season where demand
for credit is very low, the bank will find itself holding
costly idle balances. Thus, the entire situation poses great
difficulty on a bank to operate viably in a town.
11/
See Meyer and Alicbusan (1984).
,One of the ways to deal with this situation is to activate a
1.2/
funds transfer operation. This is only possible among banks
which have branches elsewhere whose patterns in the flow of funds
are inversely correlBted with at least one other branch. Thus, a
bank situated in a rural area may be a net receiver or supplier
of funds depending on the season.
A situation may, however, arise wherein a branch bank
located in a rural area is a net supplier of funds throughout the
year, This is depicted in Figure _. This bank i8 known to have
a structural liquidity problem as opposed tO the temporary
liquidity problem shown in Figure I. The savings mobilization
effort of this bank can only be sustained if excess funds can be
transferred to deficit branches more profitably than lending them
out tothe same service area.
Indeed, funds transfer operations are a bank-wide activity
involving the participation of l_he head office and its branches
with a common objective to maximize global profits through better
allocation of financial resources from surplus to deficit bran-
ches. In some areas, especially those which are overbranched,
the deposit market of a particular branch may not be sufficient
enough to cope with the demand for credit and, thus, through
funds transfer operations the branch can utilize the surplus
funds of other branches. In this situation, the deficit branch
12/
Rediscounting with the Central Bank i.8 another way out.
We will not highlight this facility at this point.
9I
I
10
can avoid sourcing funds from the external money market which may
be relatively more expensive than if the funds were mobilized
through deposits or perhaps, resorting to credit rationing when
external funds cannot be obtained at all to meet any excess
demand. Through internal or management arrangements with regard
to the use and transfer of financial resources among units, the
bank as a whole can minimize the cost of production by possibly
lowering the expenses incurred in sourcing bank funds.
In other words, funds transfer operations can be viewed by
branch banks as a resources management system responding to
policies and procedures designed to obtain more deposits
and to allocate them more efficiently to alternative uses.
Almost all managers interviewed in branches of commercial banks
recognized the significant contribution that funds transfer ope-
rations made to the profitability of the bank as a whole.
Whether or not a bank specifically perceives this fact, it is
clear that the ultimate goal is to maximize profit
through optimal allocation of funds.
III. MAJOR FINDINGS
Data from this study were obtained from the Comparative Bank
Study Questionnaire which was administered to a sample of
rural financial institutions consisting of 38 branches of
13/
commercial and private development banks and 28 unit banks.
13/
See Lamberte (1988) for a detailed discussion on sampling
design for the study and a description of the contents of the
Comparative Bank Study Questionnaire.
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Almost all unit banks are rural banks (see Annex_ Discussion
on funds transfer operations will be limited only to rural-based
branches of commercial and private development banks included in
the sample.
Generally, the trend of funds flow is from branches oper-
ating in the rural areas to the urban-based head offices,
specifically the National Capital Region (see Table I). Over 80
percent of the total commercial bank (KB) sample transferred
excess funds to their head offices located i'n the Metropolitan
Manila area in 1986. This implies that rural-based branches of
commercial banks are a potential source of- funds by the head
offices. On the other hand, 73 percent of the total private
development bank (PDB) sample transferred funds to their head
offices in the same year. At the same time, however, majority of
the PDB branches received funds from their head offices, which
makes it inconclusive to say that PDBs are funding most of the
time the lending operations of the mother branch. The figures
indicate that 94 percent of the KBs are surplus branches as
against 60 percent of the PDBs.
There is a concentration of branches of commercial banks
that transferred funds to other units with amounts greater than
p1 million but not more than PIO0 million in 1986 (see Table 2).
Thirteen branches transferred funds to their urban-based head
offices with the exception of one branch which moved funds not
only to its head office but to other branches as well. However,
out of these thirteen branches, three received funds from the
12
Table 1. Direction of Funds Flow, 1986
Type of Bank
Direction Total
KBs • PDBs
i
From sample branch to:
Head Office (HO) 21 80.8 8 72.7 29 78.4
Regional Office (RO) 1 3.8 1 9,1 2 5,4
Other Branches (OB) - - 1 9.1 1 2.7
HO and OB 1 3.8 1 9.1 2 5,4
HO, RO, and OB 1 3,8 - - 1 2.7
Did not transfer 2 7.7 - - 2 5.4
Total 26 100.0 11 100,00 37 100.0
To sample branch from:
Head Office (HO) 6 23,1 7 63.6 13 35.1
Regional Office(RO) 1 3.8 - - 1 2.1
Other Branches (OB) 2 7.7 1 9.1 3 8.1
Did not receive 17 65.4 3 27,3 "20 54.0
Total 26 100.0 11 100.00 37 100.0
Source: Re lampagos (1988). =
13
Table 2. Frequency Distribution of the Value of Transfers,
By Type of Bank, 1986 (P)
Type of Bank
Direction Total
KBs • PDBs
< 0 1 5.6 4 40 5 17.9
> 0 - 1M - - 1 10 1 3.6
>lH - 50H 8 44.4 3 30 11 39.3
>50M - lOOM 5 27.8 1 10 6 21.4
>IOOH - 500H 3 16.7 1 10 4 14.3
> 500H 1 5.6 - - 1 3.6
TOTAL 18 100.0 10 100.0 28 100.0
Mean 100,929,296 60,142,400 86,362,552
S.D. 151,138,208 142,420,384 146,764,248
Median 46,604,500 18,097,222 37,030,248
Missing Obs. KB = 9 PDB = 1 ALL = 10
Source: Relampagos (1988).
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head office, and two from other branches during the same period.
Thus,• eight branches made gross transfers to the head offices
while five branches made net transfers.
On the other hand, almost one-half of sample PDB branches
transferred funds to other units with amounts ranging from
P1 million - _100 million. Two of these branches made net
transfers to the head office, one branch made gross transfer to
the head office, and another one, to the regional office. Four
other PDB branches received funds from the head office. Thus,
there were more PD8 branches that were recipients of head office
funds compared to KBs.
There is no significant difference in the average values of
funds that surplus branches of KBs and PDBs transferred to the
head office and other units. The average value of funds
transferred i8 Pl10,411,369 and P108,543,856 for KBs and PDBs,
respectively. However, there is a significant difference between
the average values of funds received by deficit branches of KBs
and PDBs from the head office and other units: P60,266,000 for
KBs and p12,459,793 for PDB8. This is due to the fact that
almost all KB loans are fully bank-funded while PDB loans, on the
other hand, are partly government-funded (i.e., special credit
program$) or Central Bank-funded (i.e., rediscounting windows).
Moreover, this finding suggests that KBs are capable of handling
bigger loans than PDBs.
In general, as shown in Table 2, the average value of
transfers for KBs is 68 percent higher than that of .PDB_.
15
Moreover, 94 percent of the KB sample are surplus branches
compared to only 60 percent of the PDB sample.
Funds• may flow directly or indirectly from branches to the
head office. For branches located in the Visayas and Mindanao
regions, surplus fuBds are chane]led to the area/regional office
which, in turn, moves the funds to the head office. But for
branches operating in areas near the head office, excess funds
can be transferred directly to the head office through an armored
vehicle. Figure S shows these two alternatives.
One-third of the branch managers who were interviewed consi-
dered the poor viable loan demand in rural areas as one reason
why their branches accumulated excess balances. This perception
is due to the fact that bank branches prefer to accommodate large
loans, while most production loan requirements in the rural areas
__ are small. This is reflected in the relatively high minimum
loan size requirement imposed by bank branches •. Branches of
commercial banks and private development banks have required
minimum loan sizes averaging P104,057 and P182,318, respectively
(see Table 3). Enforcement of this minimum loan size requirement
definitely disqualifies small borrowers. This requirement
suggests that KBs and PDBB are oriented toward the urban com-
mercial sector where large borrowers engage in large agri-
business, manufacturing and trading operations.
Other branch managers claimed that the transfer of surplus
funds to the head office is done to comply with bank .management
16
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Table 3. Minimum Loan Size Requirement and Loan Ceilings
Per Bank Type, 1986 (P)
Type of Bank
All
KBe PDBs
1. Maximum-Amount-
Per-Loan Ceiling
Mean 604,545 2,461,111 1,143,548
S.D. 479,560 2,478,882 1,591,683
Median 500,000 1,000,000 800,000
2. Minimum Loan
Size Requirement
Mean 104,057 182,318 127,324
S.D. 140,369 207,336 164,131
Median 51,750 100,000 100,000
Source: Relampagos (1988).
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policies. It is within this context that branch managers per-
ceive funds transfer operations as a standard operating, procedure
(SOP), whereby all excess funds accumulated by the branches are
automatical.Iv channelled to the head office. Fifty percent of
the sample KB branch managers, as against nine percent of the
sample PD8 branch managers, emphasized this reason. Implied
in this result is the control in the decision-making functions
of the branches with regard to the use of the financial resources
being mobilized. The findings show that KB branches are. more
regulated than PDB branches. The above conclusion is corrobo-
rated by another finding which shows that the head offices of KBs
determine the amount of transfers whereas the branch officers of
private development banks make that determination.
PDBs have relatively higher authority level than KBs. The
average value for the loan ceiling is P2,461,111 for PDBs com-
pared to only P604,545 for KBs. It can be concluded from the
foregoing results that the discretionary power of branches in
granting loans is more restricted in KBs than in PDBs.
Funds transfer operations have also some favorable effects
on the deposit-taking activity of a branch faced with an excess
demand for credit in the sePvice area. From the deposit interest
rate and the transfer pool rate data, the average pure cost of
deposit funds for both banks, 6.5 percent for KBs and g.o per-
cent for PDBs, is significantly lower than the average transfer
pool rate for both banks, 14.1 percent for KBB and 13.0 percent
for PDBs (see Table 4). This means, therefore, that as long as
19
Table 4. Transfer Pool Rates and Interest Rates, on savings
Time Deposits, By Bank Type, 1986
(Average for the year, in percent)
Type of Bank
All
KBs ' PDBs
1. Transfer Pool
Rates
Mean 14.1 12.0 13.8
S.D. 2.3 3.1 2.6
Median 13,7 13.0 13.7
2. Deposit interest
,Rates
Mean 6.5 9,0 7.2
S.D. 1 .6 2.0 2.0
Me_dian 6.7 9.6 7,3
Source: Relampagoe (1988).
2O
the branch can extract deposit funds from the local savers, it
can readily transfer them to other branches at a profit.
Data on net transfers on a quarterly basis in 1986 were
obtained from four bank branches. Thes_ are presented in Figures
4 - 7 together with the quarterly outstanding deposits and
loans of the same banks. Several observations can be made from
these figures. First, almost all banks experienced a modest rise
in deposits during the year. This is an indication of the
intensification of their savings, mobilization effort and the
favorable response of the rural households. Secondly, seasonality
has a more visible effect on deposits than on loans.
This suggests that bank branches in the rural areas are
catering more to the non-agricultural sector whose demand for
credit is less sensitive to seasonality than to the agricultural.
sector, while they secure a greater proportion of their deposits
from farm households. And, lastly, some bank branches are net
funds suppliers at certain seasons and net funds receivers at
other seasons of the year. These are bank branches which are
encountering temporary liquidity problem. Other banks are con-
sistently net fund suppliers throughout the year. These are
banks which have structural liquidity problem. The funds
transfer operations must have sustained their viability.
What factors determine the volume of funds transferred from
one branch to another, or vice versa? It is hypothesized that
21
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the following factors, have an effect on the volume of fundsl.
transferred/received by branch banks:
I. relative prices (i.e., lending rate, deposit rate,
and transfer pool rate);
2. loan-transaction costs;
3. maximum-amount-per-loan ceiling;
4. minimum loan size requirement;
5. collateral-loan ratio; and
6. loan default rate.
The decision of a branch to transfer (or borrow) funds to
(from) another branch is determined by the lending rates,
transfer pool rates and deposit rates. If the transfer pool rate
is higher relative to the lending rate, then the branch would
choose to tranfer the funds to the head office rather than extend
them as loans in its service area. On the other hand, a higher
lending rate relative to the transfer pool rate would make
lending more attractive, hence the availability of funds that can
be transferred is reduced. Thus, it is hypothesized that the
amount of transfers is positively correlated with the transfer
pool rate, and negatively correlated with the lending rate. On
the deposit side, it is hypothesized that the amount of-transfers
and the deposit interest rates move in the same direction. A
high deposit rate offered to depositors would increase the volume
of deposit funds mobilized. Consequently, the availability of
funds that can be transferred will increase.
,26
Transactions cost on lending is a major factor considered by
banks in processing loan applications. It is hypothesized that
high transactions cost on lending induce "selective" lending
behavior among branches of KB8 and PDBs which, eventually would
lead to the creation of surplus funds.
The maximum-amount-per-loan ceiling is one way of regulating
the branch's decision-making power in approving loan applications
so as to limit its lending activities. Thus, this could result
in the creation of surplus funds among branches. The hypothesis
to be tested here is that a higher maximum-amount-per-loan
ceiling would reduce the amount of funds that a branch can
transfer to other branches, and vice versa.
A branch may require a certain minimum amount of loan per
borrower. Some banks do this in order to cover at least the
fixed overlnead costs involved in processing loan documents
regardless of the loan amount applied for. Thus, this
requirement has the objective of choosing those borrowers whose
value of loan applied for is at least equal to the minimum
loan size. Thus, it is hypothesized that a higher minimum
loan requirement creates more surplus funds in the branches, and
thus, increases the amount of funds to be transferred, and vice-
versa.
High collateral-loan ratio is expected to reduce loan
defaults. This also screens out small borrowers who cannot meet
the collateral-loan requirement. It is hypothesized that there
exists a relationship between the collateral-loan ratio and the
27
amount of funds transferred by the branch. The relationship,
however, cannot be determined a priori. A positive effect of the
ratio on the volume of funds transferred would mean that a high
collateral,loan ratio reduces the number of borrowers who can
meet the collateral requirement which eventually leads to more
surplus funds. On the other hand, a negative effect means that
higher collateral-loan ratio encourages the bank to lend more
because risk is reduced with the collateral. Hence, the amount
of funds to be transferred will decline.
There are other factors that influence the volume of funds
transferred/recelved. One example is the loan default rate.
However, insufficient data have deterred us from including them
in the model.
The model to be tested is summarized as follows:
TF = f(r , r , r , TC , LC, ML, C/L)
D T L L
where
TF = amount of funds transferred/received.?
r = weighted average interest rates on savings and time
D
deposits;
r = transfer pool rate;
T
r = weighted average lending rates of all types of loans;
L
TC = cost per peso loan outstanding;
L
LC = maximum-amount-per-loan ceiling;
ML - minimum loan size requirement; and
C/L = collateral-loan ratio.
28"
In theempirical model, the ratio of net transfers to total
deposits in 1986 is used as the dependent variable. This is a
more appropriate variable than the volume of funds transferred
since it portrays the extent of funds transfer operations. Also,
the ratio of transfer pool rate to lending rate is used as one
independent variable rather than treating them separately in the
model. Data on the cost per peso loan outstanding were obtained
from Untalan and Cuevas (1988). The rest of the data were taken
directly from the Comparative Bank Study Survey Questionnaire.
Table 5 shows three regression runs in logarithmic form.
These are the best among several models tested. Except for the-
variables minimum loan size requirement and maximum-amount-per-
loan ceiling in Model I, all other variables yielded the expected
signs. The transfer pool rate-loan rate ratio exhibits a highly
significant effect on the net transfer-to-deposit ratio in all
models. This implies that the transfer pool rate is positively
related or, similarly, the loan rate is negatively related, to
the amount of transfers. Another variable which has a highly
'significant effect on the dependent variable in all models is the
cost-per-peso loan outstanding. Result suggests that as the
/
transaction costs of lending go up, banks tend to reduce their
lending, thereby increasing the available funds that can be
transferred. Last in the series of variables which have signi-
ficant effects on dependent variable is the weighted average
deposit rates. The result shows that a high _deposit rate offered
to savers increases the volume of deposit funds mobilized which,
in turn, increases excess funds that could be transferred.
29
Table 5. Parameter Estimates of Factore Affecting the Volume
of Funds Transferred, All Banks, 1986
Variable Model I Model II Model III
i
Oonstant 6.312 -0.968 7.009
(0.451) (-0.105) (0.781)
Transfer pool rate-
to-lending rate 1_.376 7.586 8.297
ratio (3.576)*** (3.466)*** (3.231)***
Weighted average
deposit rates 2.609 4.580 4.209
(0.982) (2.311)** (1.807)*
Cost-per-peso loan
outstanding 1.130 1.047 0.933
(2.944)** (3.044)*** (2.700)**
Collateral-loan ratio -1.323 -1.327 -
(-0.942) (-1.049) -
Minimum loan size
requirement -0.317 -0.001 -
(-0.451) (-0.001) -
Maximum-amount-per-
loan ceiling 0.155 - -0.529
(0.214) - (-0.872)
Dummy -4.546 -3.192 -4.171
0 = PDB (-2.710)** (-2.698)** (-2.749)***
1 = KB
_2
R 0.671 0.649 0.604
F-Star 5.672*** 7.175,** 6.789,**
Note:
(1) Dependent variable: Net transfers-to-total deposits ratio
(2) Figures in parentheses are the t-statistic. *significant at
10_; **significant at 5_; ***significant at I%.
(3) Not all the sample banks are included in the regression runs
because of the absence of information in some of the variables
included in the model. Model I = 17 obs.; Model II = 21 obs.;Model III= 20 obs.
Source: Relampagos (1988).
3O
The collateral-loan ratio has the expected sign, although
not significant in Models I and II. But in Model III, after
dropping the variables collateral-loan ratio and minimum loan
size requirement, the maximum-amount-per-loan ceiling variable
obtained the correct sign, although still not statistically sig-
nificant. The dummy variable in all runs has a significant coef-
ficient which means that PDBs have higher net .transfers relative
to deposits than KBs. Lastly, the F-statistics of all models are
significant at one percent level implying a strong statistical
relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent
variable.
Table 6 shows the regression runs in logarithmic form of the
deposit mobilization model. This model includes both branch banks
and unit banks. In Model I, a dummy variable is included with
values zero for unit banks and one for branch banks. It yielded
a significant coefficient implying that branch banks tend to
mobilize more deposits than unit banks. The weighted average
deposit rates and loan rates .have the expected positive
coefficients, although not statistically significant.
In Model If, the transfer pool rate is used. This variable
was not transformed into natural log since a zero value is
assigned in each of the unit banks. The result obtained here is
similar to the previous result when a dummy variable is used.
The transfer pool rate coefficient is positive and significant at
one percent level. It is important to note that the transfer
pool -rate in this case acts as a dummy variable. That is why the
31
Table 6. Regression Results, Deposit Mobilization Node1,
All Banks, 1986
Variable Model I Model II
Constant -4.366 -4.026
(-1.667)* (-1.608)
Weighted average
deposit rates 0.266 0.254
(0.532) (0.517)
Loan rates 0.915 0.815
(1.346) (1.243)
Transfer pool rates - 0.067
- (3.019)***
Dummy variable 0.985 -
0 = unit banks (2.937)*** -
1 = branch banks
_2
R 0.138 0.146
F-statistic 3.351.* 3.519.*
Note:
(a) Dependent variable: Total deposits - total assets ratio
(b) No. of observation: 45
(c) Figures in parentheses are the t-statistic. *significant at
10_; **significant at 5_; ***significant at 1_.
Source: Relampagos (1988).
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results of the two models are basically the same. Implied in the
results is the favorable effect of the funds transfer operations
on the deposit mobilization efforts of the branches of commercial
banks and private development banks. Thus, branch banks tend to
mobilize more deposits than unit banks in the same service area
partly because of the availability of funds transfer mechanism.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The results of the study show how branches of commercial •
banks and private development banks deal with the problem of
operating in rural areas where most borrowers are considered less
credit-worthy and where small loans are deemed unprofitable. The
funds transfer operations of the branch banking system allow
banks to efficiently allocate bank-wide resources from surplus to
deficit branches.
The benefit from funds transfer operations is that it serves
as an _mpe_us for branches of commercial banks and •private
development banks to intensify their efforts to mobilize rural
. savings. Regardless of the seasonality of funds flow in rural
areas, branches are not worried about having possible outlets for
deposit funds since they can always resort to moving them to
other branches faced with high level of demand for credit in
their service areas. The reverse is true in the case of deficit
branches.
The major contributions of funds transfer operations among
commercial banks and private development banks should therefore
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be considered in the formulation of policies-aimed at improving
the present situation of the rural sector. Most important of
all, policymakers should aim for greater consistency between the
rural-agricultural policies and various government programs which
call on financial intermediaries to extend their operations in
the rural areas. The bottom line is that with the withdrawal of
subsidized credit programs, RFIs have to be viablefirst.
In light of the results of this study, certain government
10_i_ies need to be re-examined. Specifically, the deposit
retention scheme directly works against the objective of banks,
especially in the branch banking system, to maximize profit or
net returns on present cash flows through better allocation of
financial resources from surplus to deficit branches. It is
understandable that the government aims to increase the flow of
credit to the rural-agricultural sector, but this should not be
accomplished at the expense of the viability of banks. Whenever
RFIs experience temporary liquidity problem, i.e., they are
highly liquid at one season and illiquid at another season, or
structural liquidity problem, i.e., they have excess liquidity
throughout the period, thenthey should be allowed to direct
funds to the most profitable uses, or obtain funds from the
cheapest source. That most bank branches in the rural; areas
transferred their excess funds to the urban centers is an open
invitation to fine tune policies so as to effect economy-wide
%
structural changes. Thus, trade, price and fiscal poTicies that
are biased against rural economic activities thereby making them
unprofitable need to be reconsidered. This, together with the
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removal of the deposit retention policyand the introduction of a
more liberal branching policy, can attractmore banks to expand
their banking services in the rural areas.
The deposit retention scheme, if it perpetuates, may also
work against the efforts of banks to mobilize rural savings.
Compelling banks to invest 75 percent of their total deposit
resources in the same service area is tantamount to saying that
even less worthy projects will be financed by banks to meet
the required investment quota. This may alter the perception of
banks to intensify their deposit-taking efforts if they cannot
obtain attractive returns from their investment undertakings.
One shortcoming of this scheme, therefore, is the inefficient use
of deposit funds, over time as banks may forego a better
-alternative investment option in other areas which could have
earned them higher net returns. One of the groups of
losers would be the surplus units who will not be offered by
banks attractive interest rates on deposits.
The absence of funds transfer operations in the unit
banking system should be considered seriously in framing up
government policies which aim to increase credit supply in the
rural-agricultural sector and, at the same time, to ensure the
viability, of these rural-based financial institutions.
Perhaps, the appropriate policy here is to encourage unit banks
to strengthen linkages among themselves and/or with
branches of KBs and PDBs in other areas.to effect interbank
funds transfer operations. However, the agri/agra requirement
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and deposit retention policies impede such development.
Also, the single borrower's limit which is set at 15 percent of
the bank's unimpaired capital and surplus Can hinder unit banks
with excess funds from lending to deficit unit banks or
branch banks, as the case may be. Thus, removing such
restrictive banking policies to allow unit banks to effect funds
/_/
transfers would greatly benefit them.
Finally, the development of non-agricultural economic
activities in the rural areas should be seriously pursued. Here,
aside from appropriate trade and price facilities, the provision
of rural infrastructures, such as electricity, good roads,
adequate port facilities, communication, etc., can raise the
profitability of rural-based, non-agricultural micro-enterprises.
With a broader economic base having heterogeneous cash flow
patterns, the seasonality of economic activities would be
inconsequential to the viability of RFIs. In this regard, the
current thinking, which is gaining popularity among lawmakers, of
requiring banks to lend at least 3 percent of their loanable
funds to micro-enterprises is certainly a retrogression.
Ironically, this comes at a time when support for the removal of
the agri/agra requirement is rapidly growing. The experience of
this country as well as of other countries with loan portfolio
regulations should be considered in formulating laws and
policies. It is said that history repeats itself. But this is
not a natural law! This happens only when men refuse to learn
from experience.
14/
However, the single borrower limit to non-bank borrowers
should be retained.
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ANNEX
Sample
The targetted 66 banks were selected from the following
provinces: Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija, Laguna, Batangas, Camarines
Sur, Iloilo, Negros Oriental, and Misamis Oriental. These are
classified below according to types of banks.
Classification of Sample Banks
Type _mb_r Percentage
Branch Banks
(1) KBs 27 40.9
(2) PDBs 11 16.7
Unit Banks
(1) RBs 23 34.8
(2) PDBs 5 7.6
Total 66 100.0
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